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I .  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment granting specific performance of an 
option to purchase real property. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
A court trial on a second amended complaint \\.as held on October 15, 2007. At the 
conclusion of the trial the court stated its decision on the record. The parties later stipulated to 
additional findings, which were adopted by the coui? at a hearing on November 17. On that 
same date, the court executed the judgment ordering specific performance of the option to 
purchase the real property and specifying the terms of that purchase. (R. pp. 11 1-132; pp. 123- 
130; 131-136) 
Plaintiff then filed a memorandum of cost? which included a claim for attorney fees. 
Defendant objected to the claim for attorney fees and some of the costs, and a hearing was held 
on December 17, 2007. A written decision denying Plaintiff's claim for attorney fees was 
entered on January 11,  2008. Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal, and Plaintiff cross- 
appealed on the issue of denial of attorney fees. (Supp. R. pp. 8-27 and pp. 30-41; R. pp. 137- 
139; and Supp. R. pp. 42-44)) 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
hl 1978 Phyllis Gasser (Phyllis) and her husband John Gasser owned a ranch of 
approxilnately 125 acres on the east side of Lake Coeur d'Alene. During May of that year, 
Phyllis and John Gasser granted Phyllis' sister Wilma Claire Justad (Claire) and her husband 
R.W. Justad an option to purchase about 10 acres of the ranch. (Ex. A) At the same time, the 
Gassers sold to Justads approximately 1 1  3 acres by a contract for deed. (Ex. 2; Tr. p. 23 and p. 
The most pertinent provision of the option agreement states: 
[TJhe JUSTAD'S may elect to exercise said Option upon the deaths of 
both JOHN W. GASSER and PHYLLIS A. GASSER. Provided, that 
said election shall be exercised ~vithin sixty days ofthe death of the last 
to die, and said election shall be binding upon the Personal 
Representatives and Trustees and Estates of the Gasser's. If the election 
is not exercised within said period of time, then this Option shall 
terminate, together with all rights hereunder. 
(Ex. A, emphasis added) John Gasser died in 1984, and Phyllis died on February 19,2006. (Ex. 
Ronald Ward (Ron) initiated a probate proceeding for Phyllis' estate by filing an 
application and the original will on March 20,2006. (Ex. D and E) A hearing was scheduled on 
Ron's application for April 11,  2006, and a copy of the notice of that hearing was mailed to 
Claire on March 21,2006 
The certificate of mailing on the notice of hearing (Ex. F) states that copies of Phyllis' 
will and the application were also mailed to Claire on March 21, 2006, 
The April 11, 2006 hearing in the probate case was for probating l'hyllis' will and 
appointing Ron as personal representative. (Ex. 13. p. 2: LL. 8-10) Claire's daughter, Jodie 
Hood, attended that hearing. Much later, at the trial in October 2007, Claire testified that she had 
instructed her daughter to attend the probate hearing and to exercise the option. A transcript of 
April 11, 2006 hearing, which was introduced as evidence in this case (Ex. 13), however, reveals 
that Ms. Hood never said that the option was being exercised. 
Jodie Hood did inform the magistrate on April 11, 2006 that she was there on Claire's 
behalf and that she had her mother's power of attorney. The magistrate continued the probate 
hearing until June 15, without appointing Ron as personal representative. Written notice of the 
continued hearing (Ex. G) was mailed to Claire on April 18> 2006. 
On the morning of June 15, 2006, prior to the probate hearing, Claire's attorney sent a 
letter to Ron's attorney. The letter was sent by facsirllile at approximately 9:00 a.m. It stated that 
Claire "has elected to exercise her option immediately." (Ex. 14 and I) 
Ron was appointed personal representative of Phyllis' estate at the June 15,2006 hearing, 
which was held shortly after 1:00 p.m. Letters Testarnentary were file stamped by the clerk on 
June 16. (Ex. H) Also, on June 16 Claire filed her initial complaint in this case. (R. pp. 10-19) 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Three issues are presented by Appellant Ronald Ward. Those issues are: 
A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S AGENT 
(JODIE HOOD) EXERCISED THE OPTION AT THE APRIL 1 I,  2006 PROBATE 
HEARING WITHOUT STATING THAT SI-IE WAS DOING SO. 
B. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT I'LAINTl1'l~'S LETTER 
OF JUNE 15, 2006, SENT 36 DAYS AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE OPTION 
PERIOD. WAS AN EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THE OPTION. 
C. WHETHER THE T N A L  COUIiT ERRED IN SPECIFICALLY ENFOI<CING THE 
OPTION AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE REAL PROPERTY, WI-1ICN LACKED 
ESSENTIAL SALE TERMS, BY CREATING TI-IOSE TERMS. 
A. THE FINDING THAT CLAIRE EXERCISED THE OPTION AT THE APRIL 11, 
2006 HEARING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE. 
(Standard of Review) 
Findings of fact by a trial court can only be overturned on appeal if those findings are not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. S4arshnll v. Blnir, 130 Idaho 675 at 679, 946 
P.2d 975 at 979 (1997). Independent review can be made. llowever, when the record is entirely 
documentary evidence. Airstrean?, It~c. v. Cit Finn~icinl Services, hlc., 115 Idaho 569 at 575,768 
P.2d 1302 at 1308 (1988). The first issue on appeal challenges the trial court's finding on what 
happened during a probate hearing, and the sole evidence of u.hat happened is in a transcript that 
is part of the record on appeal. Exhibit 13 
2. 
(Evidence of the April 11 Hearing) 
The April 11 probate hearing was held within 60 d a ~ s  after Phyllis' death. An  excrcise of 
the option during that hearing would have been timely. 
In attendance at that hearing, besides Ron and his attorney, was Clairc's daughter Jodie 
Hood. It became an undisputed fact established at tlie trial in this case, held a year and a half 
later, that the purpose of Ms. Hood's presence at tlie April 11, 2006 hearing was to exercise the 
option for Claire. That purpose was not disclosed at the hearing. The transcript, Exhibit 13, 
clearly shows this. The transcript contains several incomplete statements by Jodie Hood. For 
example: 
"Um, my mother was Phyllis Gasser's power of attorney and 
administrator of her estate for many years. Uh, this went on um -- Ron 
Ward uh, became her urn, power of attorney and uh, administrator of her 
estate without my mother's knowledge. And u n ~ ,  I also -- my mother told 
-- my mother ltas --" (Ex. 13, p. I ,  L. 25; p. 2, LL 1-6) 
"I'm here just to hear what I -- I was not sure what this court date 
-- what this court was -- was about. And I flew up here from Boise last 
night. (Ex. 13, p. 2, LL. 10-12) 
Um, my point is, is my mother sold some -- that my mother owns 
a --" (Ex. 13, p. 2, LL. 13-14) 
"I'm -- 1'111 sorry, your Honor. I -- I just -- I really was not sure 
what was going on today. And I wanted to be present to hear what was 
happening." (Ex. 13, p. 5, LL. 3-6) 
The trial court's findings on what happened at the April 1 I ?  2006 probate hearing is on pages 
113, 114, and 1 15 of the trial transcript. * Most salient of these findings are: 
9 "Now, that notice of intent to exercise the option, while 
somewhat incomplete, it was on the record, it was in open court. . . ." Tr. 
p. 114, LL. 21-23 
9 "[Wlere it not for Judge Friedlander's interruptions, the statement 
would've been clearly communicated. It \~ould've been complete." Tr. p. 
114, LL. 23-25 
9 "I am finding as a matter of fact and law that that was adequate 
notice in and of itself. Without more, this was notice to the Court and it 
was notice to Ron Ward." Tr. p. 114, L. 25; p. 115, LL. 1-3 
9 "I also find that. . .Ron Ward knew who Jodie was. She was 
Claire's daughter. Knew that Claire bought from and paid for at1 
option. . ., knew that Jodie came bearing Claire's power of attorney, and 
that Jodie made all that clear to Ron Ward. . . ." Tr. p. 11 5, LL. 4-9 
9 "It was clear on April 1 I"', 2006. that Claire \\,as giving notice to 
Ron Ward.. . ."Tr. p. 115, LL. 12-14 
P "[Slo 1 find that tile option \\.as exercised. accepted on April 11"'. 
2006." Tr. p. 1 15, LL. 16- 17 
(Analysis and Argument) 
Supporting evidence for two of the trial court's preli~ninary findings is difficult to locate 
in the record. Those preliminary findings, are: (i) tvhat Jodie Hood would have said but for the 
' The trial testimony of Jodie Hood did not produce substantial evidence of 
what happened at the April 1 1  hearing. Ms. Hood either could not remember 
that hearing or she was confused about events. Tr. pp. 62-67 
magistrate's interruption, and (ii) the only reason for Jodie Hood to attend the April I I 1lcal.ing 
was to exercise the option in Claire's behalf. Eve11 if those findings are accepted, howcvcr, the 
ultimate fact is that Jodie Hood did not state she \\,as exercising the option. What Ms. IIood 
intended to do or what she might have done are not competent and substantial evidence that the 
option was exercised. Such speculative evidence is not somethiilg a reasonable trier of fact 
would accept. 
b. 
Silence generally does not constitute acceptance of a contract offer. Vogt v. h4addetz, 110 
Idaho 6 at 9,713 P.2d 442 at 445 (1985). An option can be defined as an irrevocable offer, 
which continues for the time stated in the option, granting the optionee the power of acceptance. 
Duriziano v. Finney, 93 Idaho 482 at 485,464 P.2d 522 at 525 (1970): and Sutheinzer v. 
Stoltenberg, 127 Idaho 81 at 85, 896 P.2d 989 at 993 (Ct. App. 1995). To exercise an option, 
something more than silence is required. &, Slielll~art Y. A.rfi,rd, 485 P.2d 1031 at 1032 (Wn. 
1971). Also see Restatement (Second) of Cotztracrs, 62(b) (1 98l), and 3 Corbin orz Contracts, 
11.8 (1996). 
The mere appearance by an agent at a probate hearing: coupled with the announcement 
by the agent that she held a power of attorney, is insufficient action to exercise an option to 
purchase real property. 
B. TI-IE JUNE 15,2006 LETTER, WHICH WAS SENT AFTER T H E  EXPIIUTION 
O F  TIIE OPTION PERIOD, WAS NOT A VALID EXERCISE O F  THE OPTION. 
1. 
(Standard of Review) 
The appellate court exercises free review of the trial court's conclusions of law. The 
review determines whether the trial court conectly stated the applicable law and whether its legal 
conclusions are sustained by the facts. Bei.titit7ger. v. Derifielci, 142 Idaho 486 at 489, 129 P.3d 
1235 at 1238 (2006). 
2. 
(Trial Court's Conclusion) 
Sometime after the April 1 1  hearing Claire retained an attorney for assistance in 
exercising the option. (Tr. p. 37 LL. 4-7) On June 15. several hours before the rescheduled 
probate hearing, Claire's attorney sent Ron's attorney at letter stating that she "has elected to 
exercise her option immediately." (Ex. 14) The trial court held that even though this letter was 
not within the 60-day option period, it was "timely as a matter of law." (Tr. p. 115, L. 25; p. 116, 
LL. 1-2) The principal rationale for the trial court's holding was that because Ron was not 
appointed personal representative until June 15. Claire had no one upon whom to serve notice 
until that date. (Tr. p. 116, LL. 2-1 1) 
3. 
(Analysis and Arguments) 
a. 
There are two obvious faults with the trial court's rationale. First, the trial court's 
alternative holding was that Claire had given Ron and the probate court effective notice on April 
11, 2006. If the April 1 1  hearing was appropriate for exercising the option, as the trial court 
ruled, then Claire clearly did have someone upon whom notice could be given. 
A second fault with the court's rationale is that Claire's June 15 letter was sent and 
received before Ron was appointed personal representative. If Claire had to wait for Ron's 
appointment to validly give him notice, she did not wait long enough. If it was acceptable to the 
trial court that the June 15 exercise of the option was four hours before the probate hearing to 
appoint Ron personal representative, why was it not acceptable for Claire to send such a letter 37 
days before that hearing and thus do so within the option period? 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that time is of the essence in an option agreement 
even if there is no time "is of the essence" language in that agreement. Sou111er.n v. Southern, 92 
Idaho 180 at 18 1, 438 P.2d 925 at 926 (1 968). Claire's June 15 letter was not a valid exercise of 
the option because the option had expired before that date. 
b. 
The trial court made reference to Idaho Code section 15-3-103. (Tr. p. 117, LL. 9-10) 
That statue states that a personal representative is not empo\vered to act until his appointment 
and the court issues letters. Even though a person does not have the power to act, howevcr, 
notice upon that person can still he effective. 
Several provisions in Idaho's probate code conten~plate notice prior to the appointment of 
a personal representative. Section 15-3-301 requires that an applicant for informal appointment 
declare whether he has received a demand for notice of the appointment proceedings. An 
interested person can file with the court a demand for notice of a yet to be filed probate under 
Idaho Code section 15-3-204. 
C. 
Before Claire's attorney sent the June 15 letter to Ron's attorney, Claire acted without 
advice of legal counsel. (Tr. p. 52) She believed that to exercise the option she had to notify the 
court at the time of the probate hearing. (Tr. p. 29. LL. 15-1 6: p. 36, LL. 1-5) Claire chose to do 
this by sending her daughter Jody Hood as her agent to exercise the option. (Tr. p. 51, LL. 14- 
25) She relied upon her own counsel, and the consequences were detrimental. It was after she 
hired an attorney that she used an appropriate manner for exercising an option. 
A person who represents himself in court as ap ro  se litigant is held to the same standards 
and rules as someone represented by an attorney. E~,erhcirt v. Jfrashington County Road and 
Bridge Departnzent, 130 Idaho 273 at 275, 939 P.2d 849 at 951 (1997). So too, a person engaged 
in a real estate transaction witl~out an attorney should not be evaluated by a lesser standard. 
C. THE OPTION AGREEMENT, LACKING IN ESSENTIAL 'I'ERMS FOR 'S'IE 
PURCHASE O F  REAL PROPERTY, CANNOT BE ENFORCED. 
1. 
(Requirement of Essential Terms) 
Idaho's supreme court has often held that specific performance is not available for an 
inco~nplete real estate agreement. Garr~er 11. Bmiscl~i? 139 Idaho 430 at 435, 80 P.3d 1031 at 
1036 (2003), White v. Rehn, 103 Idaho I at 2, 644 P.2d 323 at 324 (1982), and Locklear v. 
Tucker, 69 Idaho 84 at 90,203 P.2d 380 at 383-384 (1949). Also see Danie v. Golns, 121 Idaho 
149 at 152, 823 P.2d 183 at 186 (Ct.App. 1992). Among the essential terrns for a real estate 
purchase agreement is the manner for paying the purchase price. Alzdersotz v. W l ~ i p ~ ~ l e ,  71 Idaho 
112 at 123, 227 P.2d 351 at 358 (1951). Also see Lairv.ence il. Jones, 124 Idaho 748 at 751, 864 
P.2d 194 at 197 (Ct. App. 1993). 
This requirement for complete terms applies to an option agreement. Dariie v. Golas, 
supra. Also see, C.If Leave11 and Conipany i!. Grafe cr~id/f.~.rociccies, Inc., 90 Idaho 502 at 51 1- 
12,414 P.2d 873 at 876-77 (1966). 
2. 
(OptionISale Terms) 
The option agreement for which specific enforcement was granted in this case is barren 
of sale terms. Two sentences are all that express whatever intention the parties may have had: 
"The purchase price for 'said property shall be NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($97,000.00), which shall be payable in equal annual install~nents from the date of exercise of 
said Option over a ten (10) year period of titile, without interest upon the unpaid principal 
balance" and "If the Option is exercised, as provided for herein, tlie consideration paid [$100.00] 
for said Option shall be applied against the purchase price." (Ex. A, p. 1) 
The real property covered by the option agreement is described as four parcels, which are 
listed on a page attached to the agreement. (Ex. A, p. 3) One of those parcels, however, was not 
owned by Phyllis at the time of her death, and the judgment did not include that parcel. (R. pp. 
123-124 andpp. 131-132) 
Despite the limited terms expressed in the agreement the trial court found that it was 
sufficiently specific to be enforced and "any reniaining contract terms can be applied and are 
implied by the court." (Tr. p. 11 1, LL. 18-21) Tlle court created the following to effectuate the 
sale of real property: 
9 The first installment payment' Jvas due on April 11, 2006, and a second 
installment was due on April 11, 2007. Because those isntall~nents had 
not been paid, interest on the amounts of those two installments at 12% is 
owed until those installnients are paid. (Tr. p. 121, LL. 15-25; p. 122) 
P The credit given for tile aniount paid as consideration for the option, 
$100.00, is applied to the last installnient payment. (Tr. p. 122, LL. 11- 
14) 
9 Claire is to pay all property taxes accruing after April 11, 2006, but not 
any late fee or penalty. (Tr. p. 122: LL. 20-25; p. 123, LL. 1-9) 
9 The personal representative of the estate shall deliver a deed when all 
installment payments have been made. (Tr. p. 123, LL. 10-16) 
The due date ofthe first installment may be a finding of fact of an ambiguous tern1 in the agreement rather than an 
implied term created by the court. This is unclear from tlie contents ofthe decision. Tr. p. 120, LL. 23-25; p. 121, 
LL. 1-14 
9 Prepayment of the installments is permitted, Tr. p. 123, LL. 10-12, but 
acceleration of payment upo;; default is not. (Tr. p. 123, LI,. 21-25; p. 
124, LL. 1-2) 
9 Claire is entitled to possession of the real property prior to payment of all 
installments. (R. p. 133, LL. 6-7) 
9 Ron is not entitled to bring legal action for the unpaid purchase price in 
the event of default, but limited to strict foreclosure after thirty-day notice. 
(Tr. p. 123, LL. 10-18; p. 130, L. 25; p. 131 LL. 1-3 and LL. 9-15) 
Redemption rights, if any, are not specified. 
(Analysis and Argument) 
The trial court created the sale tenns in this case using the rule of implied terms. It cited 
Star Phoenix Mining Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 130 Idaho 223, 939 P.2d 542 (1997) as authority. 
(Tr. pp. 123-125) As Star Phoenix points out, the implied tenns rule has been applied by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in several decisions beginning in 1902. The wording of the rule varies 
sliglltly in those decisions. Regardless of the wording, however, that rule does not work to create 
a sale contract in this case. 
The first decision to apply the rule was Lane 1). Pacific arid Idaiio Nortliern Railway Co., 
8 Idaho 230,67 P. 656 (1902) which expresses the rule this way: 
It is a well-established rule that where a party agrees to do a certain 
thing, and does not specify how it shall be done, the law implies a 
promise on his part to do it in the usual manner, and that it shall be 
complete and effectual for the use to which the same kind of thing 
is generally applied. 
Id at 238, 67 P. at 658 (emphasis added). To apply the rule as expressed in Lone will have Ron 
selling the real property to Claire "in the usual manner" and have the sale structured with 
provisions "to which the same kind of thing is generally applied." Real estate transactions are 
not uniform, and a usual manner cannot readily be described. If such a manner could be 
described no evidence of it was given to the trial court. Further, it is doubtful that the manner 
implied by the court in this case, a title retaining installment contract, is a usual manner. &, 
Thonzas v. Klein, 99 Idaho 105, 577 P.2d 1153 (1978) for reasons a contract for deed transaction 
is unwise. 
Star Phoenix also cites Coriinzercial Ir~sl~rorice Co. v. Hortn,eii E.~cavating Co., 89 Idaho 
531, 407 P.2d 312 (1965). That decision's wording of the implied terms rule is: "it is well 
settled that a contract includes not only what is stated expressly but also that which of necessity 
is implied from its language." Id at 541, 407 P.2d at 317. The sparse language in the option 
agreement provides nothing from which sale terms can be implied. There is no hint on what the 
remedy is in the event of default. Nor is there any language in the agreement fiom which to 
imply that Claire must pay property taxes but not fire insurance while the contract price is being 
paid. 
A third Idaho decision cited in Star Phoenix is ArcI~er 1'. 1\401m/air1 Fuel Scrpply Co., 102 
Idaho 852, 642 P.2d 943 (1982). Arcl~er involved a mining royalty contract and whether there 
was an implied term to perform mining operations and to generate royalty payments. The 
decision relies on a special rule for mining royalty cases. but it also states a general rule for 
implied terms by quoting from 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts: 
"[tlerms are to be implied in a contract. not because they are 
reasonable, but because they are necessarily involved in the 
contractual relationship so that the parties must have intended them 
and have only failed to express them because of sheer inadvertence 
or because they are too obvious to need expression." 
Id at 857-858, 642 P.2d at 948-949. This version of the rule also will not work to create a 
contract from the option agreement. To apply the rule the missing terms must be relatively 
minor. In this case, what is needed for a complete contract are too numerous and too important 
to ascribe those omissions to the parties' inadvertence or to the term's obvious nature 
b. 
The trial court created most of the contract for the parties. How the sale was structured 
and what the remedy would be upon default were provided by the court. By doing this the trial 
court exceeded the implied terms rule and made a contract for the parties. &, Green v. Beaver 
State Contractors, Inc., 93 Idaho 741 at 743,472 P.2d 307 at 309 (1970). 
Specific performance of a contract cannot be granted if some of the terms are indefinite 
and uncertain or if those terms are left open for future determination. Nolan v  grin^, 67 Idaho 
138 at 142, 173 P.2d 74 at 76 (1946). While the subjective understanding of one party to a 
contract is immaterial to the interpretation of that contract. ,J R. Sitnplot Co. V.  Bosen, 144 Idaho 
61 1 a t ,  167 P.3d 748 at 751 (2006), Claire's trial testimony shows that the parties had lee 
open some terms for later determination. When asked what would be the Consequences if she 
did not pay one of the installments, Claire said, "I didn't even go into it because I knew we'd 
make them." She answered the question 011 how the $100.00 credit was to be applied by saying, 
"You're an attorney. You interpret it." (Tr. p. 56, LL. 12- 13 and 18-20) In this case the parties 
simply did not have a meeting of the minds on essential terms of a real estate sale. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's factual finding that the option was exercised at the April 11 probate 
hearing is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. and its conclusion that the June 
15 letter was an effective exercise of the option was erroneous. Further, the trial court's creation 
of numerous and substantial terms for the sale of real property was an improper application of 
the rule of implied ter~ns. 
Ronald Ward respectfully submits that the rerlledy of specific performance should not 
have been granted and that judgment should be reversed and the case dismissed. 
k 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on t h i s ~ L  day of March 2008. 
WILLIAM APPLETON 
Attorney for Appellant/Cross-Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two copies of this brief were hand delivered on March K, 2008, to the 
office of: 
Peter Smith, Esq. 
Lukins & Amis, P.S. 
250 Northwest Blvd. #lo2 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14 
,.&. C 4 /.lc, 6 2 2  7 - 0  
WILLIAM APPLETON I 
Attorney at Law 
